Current Issue: January 27, 2012 Next Issue: February 10, 2012
University life sciences labs across the country contain cultures essential to research and teaching. But many of those same cultures can be used by anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of microbiology to make a biological weapon. It’s not a purely hypothetical worry, says Prof. David Miller of Carleton University, chair of the school's biosafety committee. He cites a 1984 case in Oregon, when a member of a religious commune purchased a strain of Salmonella and, using readily available household products, prepared cultures of the bacteria that were poured over restaurant salad bars and inserted into coffee creamers. More than 700 people became sick. Criminal investigation found that the outbreaks were a test of a plan by commune members to incapacitate townspeople on the day of an upcoming election, and so influence the vote. "They’re extremely rare cases of misuse, but the fear alone is highly consequential," Miller says. That fear has prompted the Canadian government to enact stricter monitoring and regulation of university and industrial laboratories with the new Human Pathogens and Toxins Act, its pages still showing the scratchings and eraser marks from revisions. More updates to the implementation will come as the public consultations continue, and universities are keeping a close watch.
Lawmakers see the act as a companion to similar legislation that has existed in the United States since 2002: As a way of keeping track of who is handling what, and ensuring safety precautions no matter the origin of the substance. The act targets secure handling of pathogens which are infectious agents like a virus or bacteria, and toxins which are natural poisons. The Public Health Agency of Canada cites the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States as an impetus for countries to enact more stringent controls. Under old legislation, only researchers importing level two or higher pathogens or toxins from outside Canada were required to report to the government. Anyone acquiring toxins domestically went under the radar. Small universities feel the strain Under the new law, anyone using a lab with risk level two or higher toxins or pathogens must have a license from the Public Health Agency of Canada or be registered on a list under the supervision of the license holder. While most larger universities in Canada are already in compliance with the Public Health Agency’s former bio-safety guidelines, some smaller universities with out-dated labs are being hit hard. Prof. Bernadette Ardelli, chair of the biosafety committee at Brandon University, says the new rules have caused headaches and frustration in her department. She imported pathogens for many years while working at McGill University, and is familiar with the old guidelines. “The people here [at Brandon University] were surprised because they’d never heard of anything like that before.” The biggest problem at Brandon is the infrastructure, says Ardelli, as most of the labs were built in the 1970s. The ventilation system, locks, electrical system and countertops all needed upgrading. Ardelli bought new equipment for her research lab to prepare for the new rules. She bought $20,000 worth, with money Ardelli says that she had to find on her own. “It’s a small university; they don’t have a lot of money.” 'We aren’t going to go in the lab and say, ‘Oh you’re not compliant, here’s a $250,000 fine.’ We have to give them time to adjust.' — Josée Davies Luckily Ardelli was able to get a grant to help cover the expenses, and the maintenance costs are now built into the university’s budget. But she says $3,000, or 10 per cent of her yearly grant, now goes to ensuring she is compliant. Equipment and safety standards are set out in the act, and anyone who deliberately flouts them faces fines of up to $1,000,000 and 10 years in prison. But the act has not yet come into full effect and further public consultations will shape the implementation — so the rumblings of change are also rumblings of uncertainty. Brian Bjorndal, director of work safety and environmental protection at the University of Saskatchewan, says he expects more costs to come, especially related to enforcement. “Maybe there’ll be the need for additional security systems or engineering controls," he says. "Certainly there will be more resources requirements. How heavy, we’re not quite sure yet.”
Some worry the act is too broad “Right now the act is so open-ended that I worry it’s not enforceable,” says Prof. James Scott of the University of Toronto, who teaches in the Dalla Lana School of Public Health. The broad scope of the act will net any activity involving the knowing containment of a human pathogen or toxin, he says. Test kits used in veterinary clinics, building maintenance, as well as household mould tests could fall under the new rules, and require federal permits. “I think all these places that are falling through the cracks are going to continue to fall through the cracks,” says Scott. Josée Davies, a regulatory technologist with the Public Health Agency of Canada, says not all the details on enforcement have been worked out. “We aren’t going to go in the lab and say, ‘Oh you’re not compliant, here’s a $250,000 fine.’ We have to give them time to adjust.” Most university's labs are only risk group two. There is only one risk group four lab in Canada, in Winnipeg. Only one pathogen — the variola virus — falls into risk group five, and is prohibited in all Canadian labs. At Simon Fraser University, plans for a new lab rated as risk group three are in the early stage, but the regulations governing that lab may not be known for several years, says biosafety officer Melinda Skura. So far, labs dealing with biohazardous material had to send in their pathogen risk level by Sept. 21. The next phase of the act, which will more clearly define its implementation, is set to come in December. Lab activities on the chopping block But professors at Brandon are already adjusting their teaching plans. Ardelli says some professors won’t bother with procedures such as blood-typing actual blood samples in student labs. “The paperwork will kill you. It’s getting to the point where people are saying, ‘I’m just not going to do that anymore,’ or,’ I’m going to cut the lab out of the course altogether.’” “They’ve actually stopped doing a lot of those tests, which is unfortunate, because those are the things the kids actually like to do.” Ardelli says she hopes there will be changes to the way the government treats the more common level two pathogens, but adds that she supports treating the high risk levels with stringent guidelines. “I’ve been in labs where kids walk into labs, and do whatever they want. I think it’s important to know what we have, who has it . . . and I don’t even look at it from a bio-terrorism perspective," says Ardelli. "I just think in terms of safety and human health. People have the right to consent to be in a safe lab.” More Headlines |
Bioterrorism throughout the ages
1340: The Duke of Normandy’s army catapults dead horses (believed to spread disease) over the walls of the castle Thun l’Évêque (in what is now northern France) during a siege. 1346: Mongolian forces lob corpses of plague victims into the Genoese city of Caffa (now Feodosija, Ukraine) during a siege. There are 85,000 plague deaths in the region. 1500: Francisco Pizarro, a Spanish conquistador, gives indigenous peoples of South America smallpox-contaminated clothing. 1763: American forces distribute blankets and a handkerchief contaminated with smallpox as a false gesture of goodwill to native peoples during the Seven Years’ War (1754-1763). Smallpox outbreaks occur in several tribes in the Ohio River Valley. 1984: In The Dalles, Ore., 751 people become sick after Rajneeshees, followers of a religious movement, contaminate drinking water, salad bars, salad dressings and coffee creamers with Salmonella typhimurium to try to influence the local government. 2001: Shortly after 9-11, letters containing Bacillus anthracis are mailed to various media companies and government officials. Of the resulting 22 people infected with anthrax, five die. Source: Anderson, Burt et al., Microorganisms and Bioterrorism. Infectious Agents and Pathogenesis. Breakdown of the HPTA (Bill C-11)
Human Pathogens and Toxins Act: an act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins
Source: Parliamentary Information and Research Service Lonely variola
Source: PHAC, WHO, HealthLinkBC |